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I would like to start by quoting one of the most intriguing episodes 
from a book of our childhood – Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. I am 
referring to the strange dialogue between Alice and the blue Caterpillar 
sitting on a mushroom smoking a water pipe (hookah). Alice couldn’t 
control the constant changes in her body and was obsessed with the 
question “what?” – What should she eat to retrieve her identity? The 
Caterpillar will give her the solution, but first she has to undergo an 
interesting questionnaire. “Who are you?”, asked he abruptly. A very 
embarrassed Alice replied: “I hardly know Sir, just at present – at least I 
know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I have changed 
several times since then... I’m not myself, you see”. Before an astonished 
Caterpillar, Alice says she cannot be more explicit because “being so 
many different sizes in a day is very confusing”. Now, the Caterpillar, 
coming from a butterfly, disagrees with her, finding it the most natural 
thing on earth. When Alice tells him that he too will be confused when he 
eventually develops, first into a chrysalis, and after that into a butterfly, 
he replies that he will not be so, and repeats the question “who are you?”. 
This exotic dialogue between Alice and the Caterpillar may seem a 
typical nonsense dialogue, much like those in the delirious “Mad Tea 
Party”. I believe, however, that we are in the presence of something 
different: in this passage, Lewis Carroll wants to call our attention not 
only to identity issues (in and of themselves quite difficult to solve), but 
also to the fact that our very understanding of identity per se is contingent 
on our own identity as humans. From the standpoint of a future butterfly, 
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radical anatomic changes do nothing but to confirm its nature; Alice, on 
the other hand, feels lost undergoing so many body changes in so short a 
time. The writer seems to be drawing our attention to the fact that we 
have an enormous difficulty in understanding questions of identity 
whenever we are in the presence of beings which self-experience of body 
and time differs from ours. The Caterpillar is of course a metaphor, a 
literary symbol; but the quoted dialogue depicts our mind’s inability to 
understand identity experiences different from the human ones. Now, if it 
is already difficult enough to understand what we are, wouldn’t it be a 
vain task, one condemned to failure, to attempt to understand what others 
are, particularly others which in anatomy and behaviour are different 
from us, as is the case with animals? 
I intend to dispute Marc Hauser’s thesis, sustained in Wild Minds. 
What animals Really Think, that we must abandon the question of 
whether animals have a feeling of themselves, replacing it for an 
objective and scientific analysis capable of disclosing the extraordinary 
similitude between different mental procedures animals undergo when 
they face common challenges. Hauser’s thesis seems to be the repetition 
of an old debate in Psychology and Philosophy of Mind which opposes 
those who do not abdicate from an internalist phenomenological position 
of the human mind and the behaviourists, notably Skinner, who defend 
that that which cannot be understood must be eliminated. 
Marc Hauser’s stand may sound very attractive for many people in 
that it establishes an objective frame of reference which enables us to see 
that there are several mental functions common to all animals. According 
to Hauser, reasons connected with survival led some species to develop 
somewhat specific mental functions. Essentially, though, these functions 
are identical, differences being found in the expression of distinct degrees 
of specialisation only.  
As to the case we will be discussing, Hauser states that all animals 
have a mental mechanism which allows them to recognise other animals, 
but that only very few of them are able to recognise themselves and 
ultimately, that only human beings have self-consciousness proper. This 
fact is not a sign of any kind of anthropocentrism and, in Hauser’s words, 
does not make us smarter than other animals – just different. This 
difference resulted from the specific need of the human species for 
strengthening social bonds without each member of the species loosing 
his/her sense of individuality. Among the human species, one has to be 
able, not only to recognise others, but also to know oneself, thus 
determining this species’ place in the animal world as one of unique 
animals, capable of solidarity. 
Let us fist analyse Hauser’s global vision and then zero in on the 
specificity of self-consciousness in the human species. “The only way to 
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understand what animals think and feel is to explore how their minds 
have been designed to solve specific social and ecological problems. The 
same is true of the human mind. Some problems are common to all 
animals. As a result we find that all animals are equipped with a universal 
toolkit, a set of mental abilities for acquiring knowledge about objects, 
number, and space. Although humans will navigate to a restaurant to eat 
French cuisine and then leave a 20 percent tip, while honeybees will 
navigate to a field of flowers and then return to the hive to waggle out the 
distance and direction of food, the underlying mental tools are generally 
similar. (...) Specializations do not make one species “smarter” than the 
other, but they do make each species wonderfully different from the 
others.” (2000:317/318). 
What is the nature of this universal mental toolkit common to 
different animal species? First, we have the mental capacity, the mental 
tool, “that allows all animals to recognize objects and predict their 
behaviour”; second, we have the “mental tool that allows all animals to 
assess the number of objects or events, be they seeds, bananas, (...) or 
coins” (54); “the third, and final, instalment in the universal toolkit is a 
mental tool that allows to navigate” (78), thus making all of us “space 
travellers” (79). Recognising the presence of someone else, a partner or a 
predator, esteeming what one possesses, and navigating through space are 
the main features of the animal mind – human and nonhuman. But then 
we have the differences: The ability to recognise another does not 
necessarily imply self-recognition (110); the capacity for evaluating what 
one has determines that all animals possess “mechanisms for learning” 
that range from imitation to deduction (140); the faculty of recognising 
another enables the construction of tools of deceit that range from 
deliberate falsification to the simple gesture of being quiet (172). Also, all 
animals have systems of communication – at least as a form of self-
-defence; such systems differ, however, in the way they represent what 
others are saying. Although all animals, particularly the social ones, have 
a certain number of behaviour rules, only a few are able to inhibit their 
“selfish tendencies”. According to Hauser, there exists thus a global 
frame of mental functions that may or may not require different levels of 
representation, and which degree of sophistication depends solely on the 
required specialisation – in his very words, “in the struggle to survive, 
nature is the only arbiter of intelligence” (318). 
Enticing as it may sound, this understanding of the animal mind calls 
for further analysis. I have some doubts concerning the way the author 
deals with the problem of self-recognition. My thesis differs from 
Hauser’s: I will argue that many different animal species have actual self-
-consciousness and that stemming from such common denominator there 
are different ways by which self-recognition manifests itself. I will 
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challenge Marc Hauser’s thesis that the ability to recognise another is the 
common denominator of the animal mind. 
Obviously, the main difficulty concerns the issue known in the 
philosophical jargon as “privacy of conscious state”. There are, of course, 
many public events in our life, i.e. events that can be seen and described 
by anyone. But there is also a sphere in our lives which is absolutely 
private, i.e. the sphere of consciousness, which direct experience is only 
accessible to oneself. Even authors who support the need of having a 
“science of consciousness” – and science always implies neutral and 
nonpersonal observation – are unanimous in acknowledging the private 
character of conscious mental states. As to this difficulty, Hauser 
attempts to overcome it by putting it in a very high level.  
For this purpose he resorts to a story of our childhood, Snow White 
and the Seven Dwarfs. “The queen of the castle is wicked and vain. Every 
day she stands in front of her mirror waiting for the usual answer to her 
rhetorical question about beauty. But now think of about the cognitive 
steps required for the reader to appreciate those famous words: ‘Mirror, 
mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?’ The first step is to see 
that the queen wants the mirror to render a verdict on her beauty. For this 
to work, the queen must appreciate her own beauty relative to that of 
others. She thereby must have some understanding of self – a subjective 
view of herself as an individual in the world, distinct from other 
individuals. Second, the queen thinks that the mirror has a reasonable 
understanding of beauty, and uses such intuition to evaluate the beauties 
in the land. Third, when the mirror states that the queen is the fairest of 
them all, she is satisfied, because this of course matches her own beliefs. 
One day the mirror proclaims Snow White the fairest. Not only is the 
queen furious, driven by jealousy, she is enraged to discover that she had 
harboured a false belief.(...) At the root of each step is an understanding 
of self-awareness, an appreciation of who we are and how we come to 
know our inner selves, what we believe, desire, and want.” (Hauser 
2000:111/112). 
Briefly, Marc Hauser claims the wicked witch is able to accomplish 
three essential tasks that reveal self-recognition proper, allowing us to 
speak of true “self-awareness”. She recognises herself in the mirror, 
distinguishing her body from others; at the same time, she has inner 
consciousness of her supposed beauty, i.e. she possesses the inner belief 
that she is beautiful; and lastly, using her magical mirror she is capable of 
comparing her beauty with that of her equals, becoming furious when the 
mirror tells her that Snow White is more beautiful than she is. 
According to the American ethologist, some animals, particularly 
some big primates, are capable of recognising themselves in the mirror. 
Marc Hauser tells us that Darwin, in 1870, was the first scientist to use 
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mirrors to conduct experiments with animals. A century later, the 
psychologist Gordon Gallup created a test model currently accepted by 
the scientific community. It begins with a mirror being presented to an 
animal. A few moments later, the animal is anesthetised so it is now 
aware of an odourless red mark being placed in its forehead. Once the 
effect of the anaesthesia subsides, the mirror is once again placed before 
the animal. If it not only shows interest in the mark but is also able to 
remove it, watching itself in the mirror afterwards, we can talk not only 
of self-recognition in the mirror, but also of self-awareness. Why? 
Because even when the animal is no longer looking in the mirror, it 
shows a perplexity-like behaviour towards the mark in the face; this 
seems to suggest that there is an inner image of itself that remains, a 
reaction which is to be credited as a sign of belief in physical identity. 
Following Hauser, adult chimpanzees are the only animals capable of 
successfully performing this double test. Gorillas, for instance, are 
usually not interested in their reflected images: they show no aggression 
towards them (a clear indication of absence of recognition, in that an 
aggressive behaviour would imply the gorilla to have identified its own 
image with another animal), only a complete lack of interest. 
Hauser mentions an experiment with a gorilla which is, at the very 
least, intriguing. This experiment was conducted with the mediatic Koko, 
the female gorilla which linguistic and mental capacities have now been 
for thirty five years an object of study at the California Gorilla 
Foundation. She communicates regularly with human beings through 
“American Sign Language” (Ameslan), having by now mastered a 
vocabulary of more than 800 words. Hauser himself tells us: “An 
experimenter patted Koko on the head with a damp cloth while another 
experimenter carried a large mirror in front of her. Koko showed no 
interest in the mirror. One day, the experimenter patted Koko on the head 
with a nontoxic, odourless color mark. When she saw herself in the 
mirror, she did a double take and wiped off the mark while looking in the 
mirror! This intriguing observation is complemented by another 
tantalizing one: while Koko was looking in the mirror, a trainer asked 
what she saw. She signed «Me Koko»“ (2000:124). Other experiments 
with Koko show that she does manifest the three criteria Hauser equates 
with self-awareness.  
Jeffrey Masson and Susan McCarthy (When Elephants Weep. The 
Emotional Lives of Animals), speaking about Koko, describe a feeling 
that we usually associate – and for good reasons – to self-consciousness, 
namely shame: “Among her toys are a number of puppets and dolls. She 
was once seen signing ‘kiss’ to her alligator puppet. On another occasion 
Koko signed ‘kiss’ to her blue gorilla doll and ‘bad bad’ to her pink 
gorilla doll. Then she signed ‘chase tickle’, slammed the dolls together, 
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made them wrestle, and signed ‘good gorilla good good’. On each 
occasion, and other similar occasions, the moment she saw that she was 
being watched, she stopped playing”. (Masson/McCarthy 1995:182-183). 
In my opinion the authors are right when they conclude, “the essence of 
shame is the unpleasant feeling that one appears badly – week, stupid, 
dirty, helpless, or inadequate – and the dread of appearing this way.” 
(183). 
But perhaps the most impressive report about Koko is related with 
her perception of death. If a being has the perception of its own mortality, 
it means that it is able to project itself in the future and that it is able of 
imagining a world without its existence, which naturally implies a very 
strong identity feeling. One day Koko’s trainers asked her what she 
would like to have as a birthday present and she replied making the 
symbol of cat. They brought her three kittens that had been abandoned at 
birth for her to choose one. She chose the greyest one and called him “All 
Ball”. One day, the kitten managed to get out of the grounds of the 
Gorilla Foundation and was run over by a car. When Koko was told 
about the accident, she acted at first as nothing had happened. But 
suddenly she began sobbing. For a week she cried the cat’s death, 
constantly showing the sign of “sadness”. One day, Maureen Sheehan, of 
the Gorilla Foundation, spoke with Koko asking her the following 
questions: “Where do gorillas go when they die?” Koko made the sign of 
“Farewell kiss”. Maureen questioned her again: “When do Gorillas die?” 
Koko answered with two signs: “Problems” and “Old Age”. Maureen 
then asked her the last question: “What do gorillas feel when they die? 
Joy, sadness, fear?” Koko answered: “Sleep” (Patterson, F./Linden, E., 
1981:190-191) Also, Cynthia Moss, one of the greatest researchers on 
elephant behaviour, stresses that we shouldn’t see the strange relation 
between pachyderms and death as a myth. “Elephants may not have a 
graveyard but they seem to have some concept of death.”(Moss, C. 
1988:270). A female elephant was dying. Immediately, two elephant 
females, “Teresia and Trista became frantic and knelt down and tried to 
lift her up. They worked their tusks under her back and under her head. 
At one point they succeeded to lifting her to a sitting position but her 
body flopped back down. Her family tried everything to rouse her [...] 
One of them even went off and collected a trunkful of grass and tried to 
stuff it into her mouth.” (73). When it becomes evident that an elephant is 
dead, the elephant community usually performs a ritual in which “[they] 
broke branches and palm fronds and brought them back and placed them 
on the carcass.” (270). 
In Hauser’s opinion, Koko’s unusual behaviour (self-recognition, 
shame, perception of death) can be explained by her familiarity with 
human beings, and also by her being highly familiar with the use of a 
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formal language. Although this author clearly explains that symbolic 
language is not a determining condition for mental activity – i.e., the 
mind does not need double articulated language for its perfect functioning 
– he appears to assume that language is indeed a requirement if the three 
established criteria of consciousness are to be completely fulfilled. I think 
that there is no doubt as to the role of language in the mental development 
of personality; it does seem doubtful, however, that language would 
depend, not so much on the mind, but on one’s own consciousness. 
In fact, António Damásio’s work supports a different point of view. 
“When I was in medical school and in neurology training, I remember 
asking some of the wisest people around me how we produced the 
conscious mind. Curiously, I always got the same answer: language did it. 
I was told that creatures without language were limited to their 
uncognizant existence but not we fortunate humans because language 
made us know. Consciousness was verbal interpretation of ongoing 
mental processes [...]. The answer sounded too easy, far too simple [...] 
and also implausible, given what I saw when I went to the zoo. I never 
believed it and I am glad I did not.” (Damásio 1999:107). 
Damásio tell us that, instead of confirming that consciousness 
depends on those areas of the brain usually linked with language, 
neurological research show us that facts occur otherwise: “Consciousness 
does depend most critically on regions that are evolutionary older, rather 
than more recent, and are located in the depth of the brain [...] Let me 
note that is a fact, not a hypothesis – whether my hypotheses turn out to 
be correct or not, the fact remains that damage to these sites impairs 
consciousness, while damage elsewhere does not”. (275). Clinical 
situations with human patients have established that it is erroneous to 
attribute a crucial role to language in the determination of self-
-consciousness. Damásio adds: “The best evidence, in this regard, comes 
from patients with what is known as global aphasia. This is a major 
breakdown of all language function. Patients are unable to comprehend 
language whether auditory or visually. In other words, they understand no 
speech when spoken to and they cannot read a single word or letter (...) 
There is no evidence that, in their awake and attentive minds, any words 
or sentences are being formed. On the contrary, there is much to suggest 
that theirs is a wordless thought process.” (109). 
In my opinion, Hauser’s three criteria for identifying the presence of 
self-awareness meet several objections. As above mentioned, Hauser 
claims that, in order to acknowledge an individual as possessing self-
-awareness, it does not suffice that such individual recognises its own 
image in the mirror; for it to have self-awareness, it is necessary that it is 
able to maintain an inner belief of its body identity, constantly comparing 
it to other beings. Although admitting that his second criteria could 
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possibly be inferred in the case of adult chimpanzees, what Hauser is in 
fact telling us is that we can only speak of self-awareness when, besides 
an objective behaviour, we are also certain of the existence of inner 
experiences appropriate to that behaviour. 
I am convinced that Hauser is surreptitiously postulating subjective 
dimensions (e.g., the witch’s inner image of her own beauty) to cast a 
doubt on the existence of such dimensions in animals which objectively 
recognise themselves in the mirror. 
We are here in the presence of a catch 22, particularly if we bear in 
mind the essay by the North-American philosopher Thomas Nagel “What 
is it like to be a bat?” – an essay Marc Hauser himself is well familiar 
with. Hauser’s work is about an experience he had not with a bat but with 
a female spider monkey. “I noticed that a female spider monkey in one 
cage appeared to be looking intensely at me. I approached the cage. The 
female monkey approached as well. While sitting in front of me, she 
cocked her head to one side, then to the other, and then reached through 
the cage and slowly wrapped both of her arms around my neck. She 
looked into my eyes and cooed several times. What was she thinking? 
What was she feeling? (...) I was puzzled. Was this female spider monkey 
attracted to humans? Or even more worrying, attracted to me?” (Hauser 
2000: xiii) Later, he learned that she displayed a similar behaviour with 
all her trainers, which seem to eliminate the romantic aspect of the story. 
In the end of his book, Hauser quotes Thomas Nagel and tells his story 
once again, this time under the suggestive title “What it’s like to be a 
spider monkey” (315). In the epilogue, Hauser is right in recognising that 
one can never seize the inner experience of the spider monkey just as one 
can never seize the inner experience of any human being. “We will never 
know, exactly, what the female spider monkey felt when she embraced 
me, looked into my eyes, and cooed” (317). This being the case, my 
objection ensues: why does he begin by introducing subjective dimensions 
– namely, one’s inner image – in his argumentation, only to deny it 
afterwards with the argument that we do not have any objective evidence 
of their existence? 
Let us briefly recall Nagel’s central question. May we seize 
objectively and neutrally in the third person subjective dimensions, either 
human or animal, that only direct experience can perceive? To illustrate 
his thesis, Nagel wrote an article with an incisive title which became a 
classic in philosophical studies about the mind – “What is it like to be a 
bat?”. In Nagel’s words, consciousness is “a widespread phenomenon. It 
occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its 
presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general 
what provides evidence of it.” (166). Following Nagel, any living form 
that has consciousness necessarily has an experience of being the 
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organism that it is or, if we prefer it in Damásio’s words, such living form 
has the feeling of being this, rather than other, organism. Moreover, if an 
organism has consciousness, it possesses a point of view from which it 
observes the world, that point of view being an expression of a private 
and subjective experience of the self – the sentiment of itself. To illustrate 
the thesis that we cannot objectively and mentally describe the experience 
of being another organism, Nagel chose as an example the order of bats. 
It was not an accidental choice. “I assume we all believe that bats have 
experience. After all, they are mammals, and there is no more doubt that 
they have experience than mice or pigeons or whales have experiences.” 
(168). To say that a bat has consciousness is to say that there is an 
experience of being a bat. The difficulty raised by Nagel lies in the fact 
that everything points to the reality of these animals being able to draw a 
mental cartography of their surrounding space, of the different objects in 
such space, and of the objects’ form and location, using their auditory 
system. Metaphorically, we could say that they are able to “see” via 
hearing, undergoing an inner experience that we can but imagine. In 
Nagel’s opinion this extreme situation proves the impossibility of seizing 
objectively and neutrally (“a view from nowhere”) that which is given in 
the inner experience of an organism. Nagel’s thesis expresses an 
epistemological difficulty – shared by animals and persons alike – 
without contradicting the fact that mammals and birds do have states of 
consciousness. The problem lies in fact in our inability to seize the 
specific nature of experiences – be it human or animal – performed, as 
one usually says, in the first person. 
That said, my chief objection is related with the fact that the term 
‘self-consciousness’ is used in technical and philosophic language, 
having two complete different meanings. One of these, the more 
commonly used one, is, essentially, the meaning assumed by Marc 
Hauser. In this sense, self-consciousness comprehends at least a more or 
less clear representation of self-identity, and encompasses the notion of a 
self-reflexive attitude on one’s own nature. For purposes of discussion, 
we will call this type of self-consciousness ‘Socratic attitude’, for it 
implies a continuing search concerning one’s identity. Obviously enough, 
this Socratic attitude is non-existent in animals and – why not admit it? – 
in most human beings. 
There is, however, another meaning for the term ‘self-consciousness’; 
it refers to something that happens in us when we watch external events. 
According to Damásio, consciousness, even in its simplest form, 
produces self-awareness, or feeling of itself: “In short, core consciousness 
is a simple biological phenomenon; it has one single level of organization; 
it is stable across the lifetime of the organism, it is not exclusively human; 
and it is not dependent on conventional memory, working memory, 
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reasoning, or language. On the other hand, extended consciousness is a 
complex biological phenomenon; it has levels of organization; and it 
evolves across the lifetime of the organism. Although I believe extended 
consciousness is also present in some nonhumans, at simple levels, it only 
attains its highest reaches in humans. It depends on conventional memory 
and working memory. When it attains its human peak, it is also enhanced 
by language.” (Damásio 2000:16). The problem is not to identify 
consciousness and self but to show that we are in the presence of two 
inseparable phenomena. “The sense of self which emerges in core 
consciousness is the core self, a transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for 
each and every object with witch the brain interacts. Our traditional 
notion of self, however, is linked to the idea of identity, and corresponds 
to a no transient collection of unique facts and ways of being which 
characterize a person. My term for that entity is the autobiographical 
self.” (17) 
To sum up, there is no consciousness without self-consciousness, 
diffuse as it may be, because the act of building a core consciousness 
inherently entails the formation of the core self. If we acknowledge the 
presence of emotions, memory, and learning skills in animals then, if 
Damásio’s hypothesis is correct, these animals have to have self-
-consciousness, notwithstanding only very few among them being able to 
recognise themselves in a mirror. Would it be better to follow Marc 
Hauser in his use of a language centred in the mind rather than 
consciousness? From the point of view of an objective description of the 
world, I would have to say yes; but this world we live in is like a coin 
with two sides, an outer side and an inner one – one neutral, the other 
experiential. If we admit that certain animals have emotional experiences, 
memories, learning skills and the ability to project into the future, then 
we know for certain that, like us, they have internal experiences of the 
world and of themselves, making them, as Tom Regan puts it, “subjects-
-of-a-life” (Regan 1988:243), and therefore due our ethical and moral 
respect. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I intend to dispute Marc Hauser’s thesis, sustained in Wild 
Minds. What animals Really Think (2000), that we must abandon the question of 
whether animals have a feeling of themselves, replacing it for an objective and 
scientific analysis capable of disclosing the extraordinary similitude between 
different mental procedures animals undergo when they face common challenges.  
Keywords: mind, self, anthropology, ethology 
RESUMO 
Neste ensaio, discutir-se-á a tese do antropólogo e etólogo Marc Hauser, 
defendida em Wild Minds. What animals Really Think (2000), segundo a qual 
devemos abandonar a questão de saber se os animais têm um sentimento de si 
próprios, procurando antes obter uma análise objectiva e científica capaz de 
sublinhar a extraordinária similitude entre os diferentes procedimentos mentais 
quando os animais enfrentam desafios comuns. 
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